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The Supreme Court’s Rationale in 
Capital Cases: A One Way Street? 
 
Kimberly Bliss* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
On June 25, 2008, the Supreme Court held in the case of Kennedy v. 
Louisiana that the Eighth Amendment
1
 prohibited the state of Louisiana 
from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime 
did not result and was not intended to result in the child‘s death.2  This 
decision, which invalidated a number of state laws that allowed the death 
penalty in some instances of child rape,
3
 was decided on the basis of the 
Court‘s interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment in light of ―the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.‖4  The Supreme Court‘s use of this standard in capital cases in 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Pace Law School, 2011; B.A., Purchase College, 2007. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits 
the Federal Government from  imposing excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel and 
unusual punishments.  The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has been 
extended to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
2. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
3. The result of the decision in Kennedy was to invalidate state laws allowing for 
the imposition of the death penalty in Louisiana, Texas, Florida, Montana, Oklahoma and 
South Carolina.  Id.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(2) (Supp. 1996), invalidated 
by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) 
(Vernon Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
503(3)(c)(i) (2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 10, § 7115(K) (Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 
2641 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (C)(1) (Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (2007), invalidated by 
Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981).  It is worthwhile to note that the Florida 
Supreme Court, in invalidating the portion of the Florida statute that authorized the death 
penalty for child rape, relied on the Court‘s reasoning in Coker and expanded from rape 
of an adult woman to child rape.  Buford, 403 So. 2d at 950 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584 (1977)). 
4. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
The Court held in Trop that the provision of Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 
1940, authorizing expatriation of a person who had been convicted by military court 
martial of wartime desertion, violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.  356 U.S. at 114. 
1
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light of the decision in Kennedy has engendered criticism from the 
media, politicians, and other commentators on the ground that the 
Supreme Court is usurping the role of the legislature in defining the 
mores of society.
5
  This criticism by the media and others is supported by 
Justice Alito‘s dissent, which in effect moves beyond the decision in 
Kennedy to question whether the Court‘s position in past cases has and 
will ultimately influence its current and future decisions.
6
 
This Note contends that the process employed by the Supreme 
Court in deciding Eighth Amendment capital cases is decidedly biased.  
The result of the procedural bias in the standard utilized by the Court is 
an almost certain outcome of increased prohibition on capital 
punishment.  Part I will explore the standard that the Supreme Court has 
utilized in deciding Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases.  Part II 
will examine the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana.  This section will also look at the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Coker v. Georgia
7
 and explore the possible influence that the decision in 
Coker had on the Court‘s decision in Kennedy.  Part III will look at the 
impact that the Kennedy decision has had on current legislative 
enactments and could have on future legislative freedom in the arena of 
death penalty legislation.  This Note will conclude by showing that in 
continuing to utilize the current analytical framework, the Supreme 
Court, itself, is becoming so intertwined in its own process that the result 
is a predetermined unidirectional evolution of the concept of what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
 
II.  Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence in Capital Cases 
 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the imposition 
of cruel and unusual punishment.
8
  This prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, which has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
 
5. Senator John McCain called the decision ―an assault on law enforcement‘s 
efforts to punish these heinous felons for the most despicable crime.‖  Linda Greenhouse, 
Supreme Court Rejects Death Penalty for Child Rape, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotuscnd.html.  
President Obama, then-Senator Obama, stated that he thought ―that the rape of a small 
child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime, and if a state makes a decision under narrow, 
limited, well-defined circumstances, that the death penalty is at least potentially 
applicable, that does not violate our Constitution.‖  Id. 
6. See generally Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito was 
joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. 
7. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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Amendment‘s due process clause,9 has not been interpreted to be a 
stagnant, frozen concept, but one that is both flexible and dynamic.  It is 
an ever-changing concept based on society‘s ―evolving standards of 
[common] decency.‖10  In applying this evolving standard of decency to 
capital cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death 
penalty is not per se unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment, but that there is a limit on the instances 
and circumstances where the death penalty can be properly imposed.
11
  
In effect, capital punishment, as the most severe penalty, should be 
―limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most 
serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most 
deserving of execution.‖12 
In attempting to quantify society‘s ―evolving standards of common 
decency,‖ the Supreme Court has utilized a two-step approach in 
analyzing death penalty regulations.  First, the Court looks to objective 
evidence to determine whether there exists a national consensus in 
regards to the regulation in question.
13
  After the determination of the 
existence or non-existence of a national consensus, the Court then 
proceeds to utilize its own independent judgment and determines 
whether the death penalty is a proportionate punishment to the crime that 
has been committed.
14
 
In determining the existence or non-existence of national consensus, 
the Court looks towards ―objective indicia that reflect the public attitude 
 
9. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (applying the Eighth 
Amendment to the state of California via the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that 
California law authorizing a ninety day jail sentence for being addicted to the use of 
narcotics was in violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments). 
10. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  Accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 382 (1972) (stating that the standard to be utilized ―remains the same, but its 
applicability must change as the basic mores of society change‖); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (asserting that the Eighth Amendment prohibition ―is 
not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes 
enlightened by a humane justice‖). 
11. Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 2650.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
(upholding the Georgia statute that provided for a bifurcated process in death penalty 
cases); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (resulting in state death penalty statutes 
being held unconstitutional because the statutes in question allowed judges and juries 
broad discretion in imposing the death penalty). 
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
13. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 
(1977). 
14. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597. 
3
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toward a given sanction.‖15  The Court has regarded such variables as 
state practice—including state sentencing decisions by juries and the 
number of executions that have been carried out—current legislative 
enactments, and both the direction and consistency of change in 
legislative enactments.
16
  In the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,
17
 
after observing that thirty states had legislation prohibiting the death 
penalty for those deemed mentally retarded and that only five offenders 
had been executed with a known IQ under seventy, it was determined 
that there was a national consensus supporting the conclusion that the 
imposition of the death penalty on those who were classified as mentally 
retarded was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.
18
  Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,
19
 the Supreme Court 
observed that in 1989, twenty-two out of the thirty-seven states imposing 
the death penalty permitted execution for sixteen-year-old offenders and 
twenty-five of those thirty-seven states allowed the death penalty for 
seventeen-year-olds.
20
  By 2005, however, eighteen of the states allowing 
the death penalty prohibited, by statute or case law, the execution of 
juveniles.
21
  While the Supreme Court observed that twenty states still 
had statutes allowing for the execution of juveniles, it was noted that 
there was a consistent direction of change in legislative enactments 
concerning the minimum age for a death penalty sentence.
22
  The Court 
found it notable that since 1989, ―no State that previously prohibited 
capital punishment for juveniles‖ had reinstated it.23  This trend showed 
consistency in the direction of change, leading the Court to conclude that 
a national consensus existed.  The Court, thereafter, held that the 
imposition of the death penalty on individuals under the age of eighteen 
was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.
24
 
 
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
16. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (considering the legislative response of the 
thirty-five states that reenacted statutes providing for the death penalty after the Court‘s 
previous decision in Furman v. Georgia and the number of individuals sentenced to death 
since Furman); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 790-800; Roper, 543 
U.S. at 564-68. 
17. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
18. Id. at 314-17. 
19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
20. Roper, 543 U.S. at 562; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 362 (1989). 
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
22. Id. at 565. 
23. Id. at 566. 
24. Id. at 578. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/10
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After determining the existence of a national consensus, the 
Supreme Court then utilizes its own independent judgment to decide 
―[w]hether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed . 
. . .‖25  This approach follows the view that ―the Constitution 
contemplates that in the end [the Supreme Court‘s] own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment.‖26  In reaching a conclusion as to the 
proportionality of the death penalty under the circumstances, the Court 
considers whether the legislation in question serves the important social 
purposes of deterrence and retribution.
27
  For without contribution to one 
of those social purposes, the death penalty ―is nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.‖28 
In utilizing its own independent judgment to determine whether the 
death penalty under given circumstances serves such important social 
purposes as to justify its use, the Court considers the type of criminal 
conduct that is sought to be punished with death.  It has been said that 
―capital punishment is an expression of society‘s moral outrage at 
particularly offensive conduct.‖29  ―[T]he decision that capital 
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an 
expression of the community‘s belief that certain crimes are themselves 
so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may 
be the penalty of death.‖30  The death penalty, as a mechanism of 
retribution, is said to serve an important purpose in a society that is built 
on law and order rather than self-help for perceived wrongs. 
 
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, 
and channeling that instinct in the administration of 
criminal justice serves an important purpose in 
promoting the stability of a society governed by law.  
When people begin to believe that organized society is 
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders 
the punishment they ‗deserve,‘ then there are sown the 
seeds of anarchy – of self-help, vigilante justice, and 
 
25. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008). 
26. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
798 (1982). 
28. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
30. Id. at 184. 
5
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lynch law.
31
 
 
In Atkins and Roper, however, the Court looked beyond the type of 
offense being committed; it looked to the characteristics and the moral 
culpability of the criminal offender facing the death penalty.
32
  Even 
when the type of crime committed is classified as wanton, vile, and 
particularly offensive, unless the perpetrator has demonstrated a certain 
level of understanding, maturity and culpability, the criminal conduct 
may not be classified as morally reprehensible enough as to warrant the 
imposition of the death penalty.
33
  ―Retribution is not proportional if the 
law‘s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or 
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree . . . .‖34  As a 
result, certain classes of criminal offenders, such as individuals under the 
age of eighteen and those classified as mentally retarded, have been 
found to lack the requisite culpability, and as such, the death penalty for 
those classes of individuals has been deemed to violate the Eighth 
Amendment.
35
 
In addition to the type of offense and the character of the offender 
who is sought to be punished with death, the Court has looked to 
evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent against future 
criminal behavior.
36
  The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that 
deterrence is a complex factual issue and that the ―assessment of the 
efficacy of various criminal penalty schemes‖ is an appropriate 
legislative matter.
37
  Despite this acknowledgment, the value of the death 
penalty as a deterrent is an important factor in the Court‘s consideration 
of death penalty statutes.
38
  In considering this factor, the type of crime 
and the character of the criminal offender are once again evaluated.  The 
Court looks to see whether there would be a decrease in the occurrence 
of the criminal behavior for which the imposition of death penalty is 
being sought as a sanction.  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court noted an 
 
31. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972). 
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557, 568-72. 
34. Id. at 571. 
35. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
36. The use of the death penalty as a deterrent to future criminal behavior is a 
separate consideration than the use of the death penalty to incapacitate the actual criminal 
offender, and therefore, as a result, prevent the crimes that the executed criminal may 
have potentially committed in the future. 
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976). 
38. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/10
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almost ten percent increase in the number of murders, from 18,520 to 
20,400, in the three years after the decision in Furman v. Georgia was 
announced.
39
  While the Court did not find this increase conclusive of the 
death penalty‘s effect as a deterrent, it was concluded that while they 
―may nevertheless safely assume that there are murderers, such as those 
who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent 
effect,‖ there are those ―carefully contemplated murders, such as murder 
for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold 
calculus that precedes the decision to act.‖40  For these types of murders 
the Court concluded that the death penalty could serve as a deterrent. 
This assessment of the death penalty‘s use as a deterrent and means 
of retribution are the guiding force behind the utilization of Supreme 
Court‘s own independent judgment in Eighth Amendment capital cases.  
Combined with evidence of the existence or non-existence of a national 
consensus, the Supreme Court has decided throughout the past thirty 
some years that the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on 
individuals under the age of eighteen, those classified as mentally 
retarded, and those offenders who were convicted of committing 
vicarious felony murder.
41
 
 
III.  Coker v. Georgia and Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia held that the 
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, without 
the victim‘s resulting death, was unconstitutional.42  The result of this 
decision was to overturn a Georgia statute that allowed the sentence of 
death for rape of an adult woman.
43
  The Court in Coker looked to the 
 
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186.  The decision in Furman had the effect of invalidating 
almost all death penalty statutes and as such caused a moratorium of the death penalty. 
40. Id. at 185-86. 
41. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982). 
42. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).  Petitioner Coker, while serving various 
sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped from prison in 
August of 1974.  Id. at 587.  After the escape from prison, Coker entered the Carver 
house, obtained a knife from the kitchen, tied up Mr. Carver, took all of Mr. Carver‘s 
money and proceeded to rape Mrs. Carver.  Id.  After raping Mrs. Carver, Coker drove 
away in the Carver family car taking Mrs. Carver with him.  Id.  Coker was apprehended 
not long after by the police.  Id.  He was subsequently charged with escape, armed 
robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape.  Id.  The defendant was convicted on 
these charges and was sentenced to death on the rape charge after a jury found that there 
had been aggravating circumstances.  Id. 
43. Id.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972), invalidated by Coker v. Georgia, 433 
7
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history of the death penalty as a punishment for the crime of rape.  In 
1925, eighteen states as well as the District of Columbia and the Federal 
Government had statutes that allowed the death penalty in cases of rape 
of either an adult or a child.
44
  In 1972, however, the Supreme Court 
decided the case of Furman v. Georgia,
45
 which had the result of 
invalidating most of the state statutes that authorized the death penalty 
for the crime of rape.  After the decision in Furman, only six states 
reenacted their statutes authorizing the death penalty for rape.
46
  Yet by 
1977, only Georgia had a valid statute authorizing the death penalty for 
adult rape.
47
  The plurality in Coker also noted that in the majority of 
cases, juries had not imposed the death penalty for rape when they had 
the opportunity.  The Court concluded on the basis of this history and 
―objective evidence of the country‘s present judgment concerning the 
acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an adult woman‖ that the 
death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman where the 
woman was not killed was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.
48
 
Fast forward over thirty years to 2008 and the Supreme Court was 
faced with a very similar issue: whether the imposition of the death 
penalty for the crime of child rape where the victim was not killed 
violated the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.  On March 2, 1998, Patrick Kennedy called 911 to report 
that his eight-year-old stepdaughter had been raped.
49
  It was originally 
reported to the local police that the rape was committed by two 
neighborhood boys who had allegedly dragged the victim from the 
garage of her home.
50
  Due to inconsistencies in the victim‘s original 
version of the rape and other conflicting evidence in the alleged crime 
scene, police arrested Patrick Kennedy eight days after the rape.
51
  
 
U.S. 584 (1977). 
44. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. 
45. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
46. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. 
47. Id. at 595-96. 
48. Id. at 593. 
49. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008). 
50. Id. 
51. It was originally alleged that the rape had occurred in the side yard of the 
Kennedy house.  Id. at 2647.  Upon inspection of the side yard, police found that the area 
was largely undisturbed but for a small patch of blood.  Id.  Additionally, police found 
blood on the underside of the victim‘s mattress.  Id.  Police also discovered that Kennedy 
had made two phone calls: one to a colleague asking how to get blood out of a white 
carpet and the second to a carpet cleaning company requesting assistance in removing 
blood stains from a carpet.  Id.  These phone calls were placed over an hour before the 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/10
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Patrick Kennedy was charged under Louisiana law with the aggravated 
rape of his then eight-year-old stepdaughter.
52
  After a jury found Patrick 
Kennedy guilty of aggravated rape, he was sentenced to death under a 
state statute that authorized capital punishment for the rape of a child 
who was under twelve years of age.
53
  The Louisiana Supreme Court 
upheld Patrick Kennedy‘s conviction and sentence, rejecting the 
contention that Coker barred the use of the death penalty as a punishment 
for rape.
54
  The Louisiana Supreme Court ―distinguished the rape of a 
child from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Coker.  For 
while Coker clearly bars the use of the death penalty as punishment for 
the rape of an adult woman, it left open the question of which, if any, 
non-homicide crimes can be constitutionally punished by death.‖55 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.  ―Based both on consensus 
and [their] own independent judgment, [the Court‘s] holding [was] that 
[the] death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who 
did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖56  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Supreme Court looked once again to objective evidence 
to determine whether a national consensus existed in regards to the death 
penalty as punishment for the crime of child rape, where the child was 
neither killed nor was intended to be killed.  The Court looked to the 
history of the death penalty for the crime of rape as its starting point in 
determining whether there was a national consensus.  In 1925, eighteen 
states had statutes that authorized the death penalty for the rape of a 
child.
57
  Between the years of 1930 and 1964, four hundred and fifty-five 
individuals were executed for rape.
58
  It was in 1964 that the last known 
 
phone call to 911.  Id. 
52. Id. 
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(2) (Supp. 1996), invalidated by Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).  The statute provides that ―[a]ggravated rape is a rape 
committed . . . where the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without 
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the 
following circumstances . . . [such as] [w]hen the victim is under the age of twelve years.  
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (A)(4) (Supp. 1996).  The statute further provides that ―if 
the victim was under the age of twelve years . . . [a]nd if the district attorney seeks a 
capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment . . . in 
accordance with the determination of the jury.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(1). 
54. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2648. 
55. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 781 (La. 2007). 
56. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51. 
57. Id. at 2651. 
58. Id. 
9
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individual was executed for the rape of a child.
59
 
After the decision in Furman, which had the effect of invalidating 
most state statutes that authorized the death penalty for the crime of rape, 
six states revised and reinstated their capital rape statutes.
60
  By the end 
of 1977, all six of these statutes were invalidated.
61
  In 1995, the state of 
Louisiana reenacted the death penalty for the rape of a child under the 
age of twelve.
62
  Since 1995, five other states have enacted legislation 
allowing for the death penalty in some instances of child rape: Georgia, 
Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.
63
  The statutes in 
Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas make child rape a 
capital offense when the offender has a previous rape conviction.
64
  
Georgia‘s statute had the effect of making child rape a capital crime 
when aggravating circumstances existed.
65
  Under Georgia‘s statute, 
aggravating circumstances included factors, such as the prior record of 
conviction for a capital offense, the crime being committed while the 
offender was engaged in another capital crime or in the commission of 
burglary or arson in the first degree, the crime being committed for the 
purpose of receiving money, or the crime was outrageously vile or 
inhuman.
66
 
The Court in reaching a conclusion about the existence of a national 
consensus compared this data with that in Atkins, Roper, and Enmund.  
In Atkins, the Court noted that thirty states prohibited the death penalty 
for mentally retarded individuals.
67
  In Roper, there was a similar amount 
of states prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on those under 
the age of eighteen.
68
  In Enmund, only eight jurisdictions allowed the 
imposition of the death penalty for participation in a robbery during the 
course of which an accomplice committed murder.
69
  In comparison, the 
Court found that the six states allowing for the imposition of the death 
 
59. Id.  Ronald Wolfe was executed in 1964. 
60. Id.  Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana reenacted their statutes for all rape 
offenses.  Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee reenacted their statutes only in respect to 
child rape.  Id. 
61. Id.  The decision in Coker invalidated the last of the six statutes that had been 
reenacted. 
62. Id.  The statute later was modified to allow for the death penalty for the rape of 
a child less than thirteen years of age, instead of twelve. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (Supp. 2007). 
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(1-11) (Supp. 2007). 
67. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/10
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penalty in cases of child rape was not evidence of a national consensus. 
 
The evidence of a national consensus with respect to the 
death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to 
juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, and vicarious 
felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, on 
balance, an opinion against it. Thirty-seven jurisdictions 
– 36 States plus the Federal Government – have the 
death penalty. As mentioned above, only six of those 
jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a 
child. Though our review of national consensus is not 
confined to tallying numbers of States with applicable 
death penalty legislation, it is of significance that, in 45 
jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child 
rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in 
Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that 
prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances 
those cases considered.
70
 
 
It was acknowledged that an otherwise consistent direction of change in 
legislative enactments might otherwise ―counterbalance an otherwise 
weak demonstration of consensus,‖ but the Court ultimately determined 
that there had been no showing that a consistent change had occurred.
71
 
Beyond the consideration of legislative enactments, state practice in 
regards to executions and jury sentencing decision also factored into the 
determination of the non-existence of a national consensus.  It was found 
highly significant that while nine states had permitted the death penalty 
for rape for some period of time between 1972 and 2008, no state had 
executed any individual for the rape of either an adult or a child since 
1964.  The Court noted that at the time of its decision there were only 
two individuals on death row in the United States for non-homicide 
crimes.
72
  Based on this objective evidence, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there was no national consensus in support of capital 
punishment for the crime of child rape.  To the contrary, it was the 
conclusion of the Supreme Court that there was a national consensus 
against the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child. 
 
70. Id. at 2653. 
71. Id. at 2656. 
72. Id. at 2657.  Besides Patrick Kennedy, Richard Davis has also been convicted of 
the aggravated rape of a five-year-old child and sentenced to death by a Louisiana jury.  
Id. 
11
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Having concluded that there was a national consensus against the 
use of capital punishment as a penalty for the crime of child rape, the 
Court went on to utilize its own independent judgment.  It was 
recognized that the victim of child rape would suffer from potentially 
permanent psychological and emotional damage.
73
  Despite this 
recognition of the far-reaching impact of child rape on its victim, the 
Court found that ―there [was] a distinction between intentional first-
degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against 
individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.‖74  This 
distinction lies in the fact that murder is irrevocable in its effect.  
Likewise, the Court views capital punishment as unique and the most 
severe of all punishments for its irrevocability. 
Further, the Court took into consideration the number of instances 
of reported child rape versus that of first-degree murder.
75
  The Court 
notes that ―approximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or oral rape of 
a child under the age of 12 were reported nationwide in 2005.‖76  This 
number was twice the amount of ―total incidents of intentional murder 
for victims of all ages (3,405) reported during the same period.‖77  This 
significantly large pool of offenders who would potentially be subject to 
capital punishment conflicts with the principle behind many of the 
Court‘s decisions that use of the death penalty should be narrowed to 
only the most depraved offenders.  The Court also expressed concern that 
the characteristics of the crime of child rape could potentially overwhelm 
a juror‘s judgment, leading to the arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty.
78
 
Looking towards the death penalty‘s possible effect as a deterrent 
against future instances of child rape, the Supreme Court weighed into 
the balance the fact that child sexual abuse is underreported.  ―[O]ne of 
the most commonly cited reasons for the nondisclosure [of child rape] is 
the fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator . . . .‖79  This fear 
has increased relevance when the alleged perpetrator is a family member.  
In the reasoning of the Court, the fear of the consequences for the 
perpetrator is increased when capital punishment is an option.  This 
increased fear, due to the availability of the death penalty as a potential 
 
73. Id. at 2658. 
74. Id. at 2660. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 2661. 
79. Id. at 2664. 
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sanction, would possibly lead to a decrease in disclosure of child rape.  
This decrease in disclosure would be counterproductive to any possible 
deterrent benefits derived from the utilization of the death penalty.  ―In 
addition, by effectively making the punishment for child rape and murder 
equivalent, a State that punishes child rape by death may remove a strong 
incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim.‖80  These concerns, 
supported by evidence of a national consensus, led the majority to 
conclude that the death penalty as a sanction for child rape where the 
victim was not killed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
81
 
The conclusion drawn by the Court that there existed a national 
consensus against the use of the death penalty as a sanction for child rape 
was contested by Justice Alito‘s dissent.  ―In assessing current norms, the 
Court relies primarily on the fact that only 6 of the 50 states now have 
statutes that permit the death penalty for this offense.  But this statistic is 
a highly unreliable indicator of the views of state lawmakers and their 
constituents.‖82  As a result of the Court‘s decision in Coker, legislatures 
have been stunted in their consideration of the matter.  While the holding 
in Coker was specific to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for 
the rape of adult women, the dicta and reasoning behind the opinion 
suggested that the death penalty would be unconstitutional in all 
instances of rape where the victim was not killed.  Justice Alito‘s dissent 
lists the numerous state court decisions that have misconstrued the Coker 
decision.
83
  In Utah v. Gardner, it was said ―[t]he Coker holding leaves 
no room for the conclusion that any rape, even an ‗inhuman‘ one 
involving and aggravated battery but not resulting in death, would 
constitutionally sustain imposition of the death penalty.‖84  Likewise, in 
Merrow v. Georgia, it was determined that while Georgia law continued 
to ―prescribe that the death penalty may be imposed for some crimes 
(e.g., armed robbery, rape, kidnapping with bodily injury)‖ that 
―constitutional decisional law prescribes that the death penalty cannot be 
imposed where no death results.‖85 
 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 2666 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 2667 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Utah v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 653 
(Utah 1997)). 
85. Merrow v. Georgia, 601 S.E.2d 428, 429-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).  In 2008 prior to the decision in Kennedy, the Georgia 
Supreme Court recognized that the United States Supreme Court had not yet ―addressed 
whether the death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for the crime of raping a 
child.‖  Georgia v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ga. 2008).  The statement in 
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Even those courts that did not misconstrue the holding in Coker 
recognized that Coker raised doubts as to whether statutes that allowed 
for the death penalty for non-homicide crimes could be constitutionally 
sustained.
86
  In People v. Hernandez, the California Supreme Court 
recognized that the decision in Coker raised ―serious doubts that the 
federal Constitution permitted the death penalty for any offense not 
requiring the actual taking of human life.‖87  And in People v. 
Huddleston, the Illinois Supreme Court also recognized that ―the 
constitutionality of state statutes that impose[d] the death penalty for 
nonhomicide crimes [was] the subject of debate.‖88  These doubts as to 
the constitutionality of capital punishment for non-homicide crimes such 
as child rape were further fostered by the Court‘s decision in Eberheart 
v. Georgia, where the Court vacated the death penalty for the crime of 
aggravated kidnapping, and their decision in Enmund, where the use of 
the death penalty as a sanction for those vicariously involved in felony 
murder was held unconstitutional.
89
 
 
For the past three decades, these interpretations [and 
doubts] have posed a very high hurdle for state 
legislatures considering the passage of new laws 
permitting the death penalty for the rape of the child. 
The enactment and implementation of any new state 
death penalty statute–and particularly a new type of 
statute such as one the specifically targets the rape of 
young children–imposes many costs. There is the burden 
of drafting an innovative law that must take into account 
this Court‘s exceedingly complex Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence . . . .  And if the law is eventually 
overturned, there is the burden of new proceedings on 
remand . . . .  Accordingly, the Coker dicta gave state 
legislators a strong incentive not to push for the 
enactment of new capital child-rape laws even though 
these legislators and their constituents may have 
believed that the laws would be appropriate and 
 
Velazquez, while clarifying the position of the Georgia Supreme Court, does not discount 
the argument that many courts have misconstrued the holding in Coker. 
86. See People v. Hernandez, 30 Cal. 4th 835, 867 (2003); Leatherwood v. State, 
548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989). 
87. Hernandez, 30 Cal. 4th at 867. 
88. People v. Huddleston, 816 N.E.2d 322, 341 (Ill. 2004). 
89. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977).  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982). 
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desirable.
90
 
 
This suppression of the natural development of legislative 
enactments can be seen in the arguments made by the opposition to 
proposed capital rape statutes in Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.
91
  
In all three states, opponents argued that the statutes would be wasteful 
and doomed, as the Coker dicta suggested that these statutes would be 
held unconstitutional.
92
  Keith Hampton, a spokesperson for the Texas 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association stated that the then-proposed 
statute was ―not going to be constitutional.‖93  Likewise, Barbara 
Bergman, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, argued that Supreme Court decisions limited the death penalty 
to instances where a life was taken.
94
  In 2006, in response to the South 
Carolina Senate passing a bill that authorized the death penalty for 
defendants convicted twice for the rape of a child under the age of 
eleven, it was argued that the law ―violate[d] the Eighth Amendment‘s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.‖95 
Legal commentators have also repeatedly expressed the viewpoint 
that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Coker could be applied to prohibit 
the imposition of the death penalty for all rapists regardless of the age of 
the victim.  In one law review article attempting to predict the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Kennedy, it was stated that 
 
the Court‘s plurality opinion [in Coker] supports one simple 
conclusion--the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for rape because the victim does not die. Stated 
alternatively, it is unconstitutional to execute the perpetrator 
of a crime unless the victim dies. This simple rationale 
seems to apply as equally to the rape of a child under the 
age of twelve as it does to the rape of an adult woman.
96
 
 
90. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2667-68 (2008). 
91. Id. at 2668. 
92. Id. 
93. Mike Ward, Victims Groups, Prosecutors See Problems with Dewhurst 
Proposal, STATESMAN, Jan. 22, 2007, 
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/region/legislature/stories/01/23/23jessica.html. 
94. Oklahoma Gov. Approves Death Penalty for Repeat Child Molesters, FOX 
NEWS, June 9, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198931,00.html. 
95. Colin Garrett, Death Watch: South Carolina Death Penalty for Child Rapists 
‘Likely to be Unconstitutional’, 30 CHAMPION 46 (June 2006). 
96. David W. Schaaf, What if the Victim is a Child? Examining the 
Constitutionality of Louisiana’s Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 347, 
15
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In another article that discussed the use of the death penalty for non-
homicide crimes, it was argued that by ―[c]ombining the Coker reasoning 
with the logic behind the Enmund decision, the Supreme Court . . . 
[would] find that the use of the death penalty for a crime which does not 
involve the death of another human being is grossly disproportionate.‖97  
This argument was based on the view that ―[t]he plurality in Coker chose 
to draw a bright-line rule between homicide and non-homicide crimes 
when it came to the application of the death penalty.‖98  And yet another 
article claimed that in Coker, ―the Supreme Court ruled that the 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes from which no death results 
violates the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth 
amendment.‖99  And still, another article noted that ―[i]mposing the death 
penalty for nonhomicides ha[d] been legally troubling since 1977.‖100  As 
the article explained, it had become so troubling because it was in that 
year that ―the U.S. Supreme Court held in Coker . . . that the Eighth 
Amendment‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prevents states from 
executing defendants who rape adult woman.‖101 
With the natural development of legislative enactments curtailed, 
inaction by state legislatures is not necessarily evidence of a societal 
view disfavoring capital punishment in child rape cases.  In light of the 
shadow of Coker, it seems that more weight should be given to the six 
states that enacted capital child rape statutes.  The actions of those states, 
despite the doubts created by Coker about the constitutionality of the 
statutes enacted, suggest a deep societal concern about the punishment of 
child rapists. 
This societal concern coincides with the increase in number of 
reported cases of child sexual abuse since the mid-1970s.
102
  In 1976, the 
number of reported cases of sexual abuse was six thousand.
103
  By 1990, 
 
353-54 (2000). 
97. Jeffrey C. Matura, When Will It Stop? The Use of the Death Penalty for Non-
homicide Crimes, 24 J. LEGIS. 249, 262 (1998). 
98. Id. at 252. 
99. Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the Death 
Penalty Debate in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 873, 878 
(1991). 
100. Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment For Killers Only?, 83 A.B.A. J. 30, 
30 (Aug. 1997). 
101. Id. 
102. Arthur J. Lurigio, Marylousie Jones & Barbara E. Smith, Child Sexual Abuse: 
Its Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 
69, 69 (Sept. 1995). 
103. Id. 
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there were an estimated one hundred and forty-six thousand cases of 
child sexual abuse.
104
  In 2003, there were an estimated ninety thousand 
cases of child sexual abuse.
105
  As a result, this concern with the sexual 
abuse of children has manifested itself in the enactment of various 
statutes that require the registration of convicted sex offenders in all of 
the fifty states.
106
  In addition, many states also have statutes permitting 
the involuntary commitment of ―sexual predators‖ or statutes that impose 
residency and employment restrictions on individuals who are convicted 
sex offenders.
107
 
 
104. Crimes Against Children Research Center, Sexual Abuse, 
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/sexual-abuse/Child%20Sexual%20Abuse.pdf. 
105. Id. at 2. 
106. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2670.  For a list of state statutes, see id. at n.3 (citing 
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200, 13A-11-201(1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 1.56.840, 12.63.010-
100, 18.65.087, 28.05.048, 33.30.035 (1995 and 1995 Cum. Supp.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 3825 (1989 and Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 909 
(1995); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290 to 290.4 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18-3-412.5 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.  §§ 54-102a to 54-102r (West Supp. 1995); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.  §§ 775.13, 775.22 (West 1992 
and Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); Act of June 14, 1995, 1995 Haw. 
Sess. Laws 160; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-340(11)(f), 18-8301 to 18-8311 (Supp. 1995); 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730 §§ 150/1 to 150/10 (West 2002); IND. CODE §§ 5-2-12-1 
to 5-2-12- 13 (West Supp. 1995); Act of May 3, 1995, 1995 Iowa Legis. Serv. 146 
(West);  KAN. STAT. ANN.  §§ 22-4901 to 4910 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 17.500 to 
540 (West Supp. 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:540 to 549 (Supp. 1995); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to 11004 (Supp. 1995); Act of May 9, 1995, 1995 Md. 
Laws 142; MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch.  6, § 178D ; Act of July 13, 1994, 1994 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 295; MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1992 and Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE. ANN.  §§ 45-33-1 
to 45-33-19 (Supp. 1995); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 566.600 to 625 (Supp. 1996); MONT. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to 507 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 4001 to 4014; NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 207.080, 207.151 to 157 (1992 and Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-
A:11 to A:19 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c: 7-2 to 7-11 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to 11A-8 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-V 
(McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5 to208.10 (Supp. 1995); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2950.01 to 2950.08 
(West 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 582 -84 (Supp. 2003); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 181.507-
519 (1993); Act of Oct. 24, 1995 Pa. Laws 24; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1994); S.C. 
CODE. ANN. § 23-3-430; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-30 to 22-22-41 (Supp. 1995); 
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-108 (2003); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 
6252-13c.1 (Vernon Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-212.5, 77-27-21.5. (Supp. 
1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5402; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 390.1 (1995); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130, 9A.44.140, 10.01.200, 70.48. 470, 72.09.330 
(1992 and Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to 61-8F-8 (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. § 
174.45 (Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 306 (1995)). 
107. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2670.  There are twenty-one states with statutes 
permitting the involuntary commitment of sexual predators.  For a list of these twenty-
one statutes, see id. at n.4 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3701 to 3713 (2003 and Supp. 
1998); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE  §§ 6600 to 6609. 3 (West 1998 and Supp. 2008); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a -566 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910 to 931 (West 2002 
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This societal concern has grown not only out of the dramatic 
increase in the number of reported instances of child rape and sexual 
abuse, but also from the growing awareness of the corresponding 
physical, psychological and social effects on victims of child rape.  The 
physical problems that result from child rape have been reported as 
―abdominal pain, vomiting, urinary tract infections, perineal bruising and 
tearing, pharyngeal infections, and venereal diseases.‖108  There has also 
been research to suggest that the trauma sustained by a child during rape 
could be one of the ―cause[s] of the early onset cervical cancer.‖109  
Beyond the physical effects of child rape, a victim of child rape is likely 
to suffer from potentially severe psychological problems. 
 
Psychological problems stemming from child rape 
include depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances, 
nightmares, compulsive masturbation, loss of toilet 
training, sudden school failure, and unprovoked crying. 
The child who has been raped is also subject to feelings 
of guilt, poor self-esteem, feelings of inferiority, self-
destructive behavior, a greater likelihood of becoming a 
drug or alcohol addict, and increased suicide attempts. 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that these disturbances 
follow the child into adulthood.
110
 
 
 
and Supp. 2005); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 207/1 to 201/99 (2002); IOWA CODE §§ 
229A.1 to .16 (Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2004 and Supp. 2005); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.051; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (1989); MINN. STAT. § 
253B.02 (1992); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to 513 (West 2000 and Supp. 2006); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 83-174 to 83-174.05 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4 -27.24 to 30:4-27.38 
(West Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE  § 25-03.3 (2002); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.005 
(1998); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791-99 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to 44-
48-170 (2002 and Supp. 2007); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001 to 
841.147 (Vernon 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to 920 (2006 and Supp. 2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992 and Supp. 2002); WIS. STAT. § 980.01-13 (2005). 
There are at least 11 states that have enacted residency restrictions for sex offenders.  See  
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (Supp. 2007); CAL. 
PENAL CODE  § 3003 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405 (7)(a)(2)(2001); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (Supp. 2007);  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11 – 9.3(b-5) (Supp. 
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:91.1 (Supp. 
2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 
590 (West 2003); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 144.642-643 (1999)). 
108. Melissa Meister, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child 
Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 208-09 (2003). 
109. Id. at 209. 
110. Id. 
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Yet due to the language and reasoning of Coker, there is a high level 
of likelihood that state legislatures were unnaturally influenced in their 
actions in considering capital child rape enactments.  Despite this 
possibility of a constrained legislature, the majority found there to be 
sufficient evidence that there was a national consensus against the 
imposition of the death penalty in instances of child rape that did not 
result in death of the child.  This conclusion was supported by the 
Court‘s own independent judgment, leading it to conclude that capital 
child rape statutes were unconstitutional as cruel and unusual under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
IV.  Impact of Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Kennedy 
v. Louisiana was readily apparent in the invalidation of the capital child 
rape statutes, not only in Louisiana, but also in Texas, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Montana, and Oklahoma.
111
  The holding that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional as a penalty for child rape also had the effect of 
removing that particular sanction from the consideration of other state 
legislatures.  Before the decision had been reached, there was evidence 
that the states of Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri and 
Tennessee had been contemplating legislation authorizing the death 
penalty for child rape.
112
 
In fact, after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Kennedy, 
eighty-five members of Congress sent a letter to the Court asking that its 
ruling be reconsidered.
113
  That letter reflected a concern with the Court‘s 
failure to recognize a 2006 amendment that had been passed by Congress 
that allowed for the death penalty for the crime of child rape under the 
Uniformed Code of Military Justice.  The Court was urged to consider 
the fact that the provision allowing for the death penalty in child rape 
cases passed the House of Representatives by a vote of three hundred and 
seventy four to forty-one, and passed in the Senate by a vote of ninety-
five to zero.
114
  The eighty-five members of Congress urged that this 
 
111. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rejects Death Penalty for Child Rape, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotuscnd.html?pagewanted=1&_r=. 
112. Brief for Texas, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, No. 07-343, 
2008 WL 782550, at *10, (U.S. Mar. 19, 2008), for Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 
2641 (2008). 
113. Rep. Cubin Signs Letter Asking Court to Reconsider Child Rape Decision, US 
FED. NEWS, July 23, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 13782270. 
114. Id.   
19
1334 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
voting record showed evidence of a national consensus.  The Court 
denied the request to rehear the case, maintaining its original holding: the 
death penalty as a penalty for child rape is unconstitutional as a violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
115
 
The decision in Kennedy, however, reached far beyond the instances 
of child rape.
116
  While the Court‘s holding did not address offenses 
against the State, such as ―treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug 
kingpin activity,‖ the holding is not limited to child rape but is also 
applicable to other criminal offenses against an individual where the 
victim is not killed.
117
  The Court held that ―[a]s it relates to crimes 
against individuals . . . the death penalty should not be expanded to 
instances where the victim‘s life was not taken.‖118  The holding 
therefore limits state legislators not just in terms of using the death 
penalty for instances of child rape, but also in the use of the death 
penalty as a punishment for almost all non-murder crimes.  In being so 
constrained, state legislators cannot freely advocate for the consensus 
and will of their constituents. 
State legislators and members of Congress, as elected officials, are 
supposed to serve as the voice of their constituents.  A holding restricting 
state legislators and members of Congress has the ultimate effect of 
limiting the voice of the people. 
 
[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are 
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the 
moral values of the people. The deference we owe to the 
decisions of the state legislatures under our federal 
system, is enhanced where the specification of 
punishment is concerned, for these peculiarly questions 
of legislative policy. Caution is necessary lest this Court 
become, under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards 
of criminal responsibility . . . throughout the country. A 
decision that a given punishment is impermissible under 
the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a 
constitutional amendment. The ability of the people to 
express their preference through the normal democratic 
 
115. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Mem.). 
116. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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processes, as well as through ballot referenda, is shut 
off.
119
 
 
Beyond the effect on the ability of state legislatures as the voice of 
their constituents to enact statutes allowing for the death penalty in non-
murder crimes, there is also a non-obvious effect on state practices with 
respect to capital punishment.  As capital punishment is now 
circumscribed to instances of murder and potentially crimes against the 
state, the number of offenders exposed to the possible sanction of the 
death penalty will be necessarily limited.  As the Court in Kennedy 
noted, there were ―[a]pproximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or 
oral rape of a child under the age of 12 were reported nationwide in 
2005.‖120  The associated number of offenders connected with those 
reported incidents of child rape are now permanently excluded, as a 
result of the Court‘s decision in Kennedy, from the pool of individuals 
who could have been exposed to the death penalty.  And while it cannot 
be proven to an absolute certainty, a limited pool of offenders who are 
potentially vulnerable to the death penalty will almost certainly result in 
a decreased number of offenders who will be sentenced to death in 
comparison to the number of individuals that would have been sentenced 
with capital punishment had the pool of potential offenders been more 
encompassing.  As the Court has, in previous cases, looked towards the 
actual numbers of individuals sentenced to death as evidence of the 
existence or non-existence of a national consensus, this potentially 
decreased number, therefore, has the potential of impacting the Supreme 
Court‘s determination in future death penalty cases.121  By manipulating 
the possible pool of offenders exposed to the death penalty, the Supreme 
Court has unnaturally influenced one of the very ―objective factors‖ of 
state practice that it has typically relied on in determining whether or not 
there is a natural consensus concerning death penalty regulations. 
The impact of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana affects not only the actual statutes that it has invalidated; it 
also has an impact on future state enactments and future state practice in 
regards to execution.  These two areas of impact coincide with two of the 
main areas that influence the Court in its determination of the existence 
 
119. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
120. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660.  It is noted in Kennedy that this number is twice 
that of the total number of incidents of intentional murder for the same time period.  Id. 
121. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-65 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 316 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
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of a national consensus.  As a result, under the current scheme of Eighth 
Amendment capital jurisprudence, the Kennedy decision will ultimately 
have an influence on the objective evidence that is utilized in the 
determination of whether there is a national consensus in future death 
penalty cases.  So while the decision in Kennedy has only been a partial 
victory for those that oppose the death penalty,
122
 it is possible that this 
current victory eventually could lead to the ultimate triumph for those 
morally opposed to capital punishment: the declaration that the death 
penalty itself is cruel and unusual punishment. 
Yet, perhaps that outcome is implicit in the very concept of 
―evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.‖123  The words ―evolving,‖ ―progress,‖ and ―maturing‖ denote 
the idea that society with its evolving standards of decency is moving 
towards some ultimate ideal of society.  For as the majority in Kennedy 
stated in response to the concern that it was, by its own actions, 
interfering with the natural development of consensus: 
 
these concerns overlook the full meaning and substance 
of the established proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment is defined by the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 
Confirmed by repeated, consistent rulings of this Court, 
this principle requires that use of the death penalty be 
restrained. The rule of evolving standards of decency 
with specific marks on the way to full progress and 
mature judgment means that resort to the penalty must 
be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its 
instances of application.
124
 
 
 
 
 
122. However, even those that morally oppose the death penalty have criticized the 
Kennedy decision for its reasoning. 
123. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2664 (quotation omitted). 
124. Id. at 2664-65 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/10
